A Federalist Fiscal Stimulus

Many economists are calling for another fiscal stimulus package. For example, Martin Feldstein, who once wrote an article called "The Retreat from Keynesian Economics," recently pulled a full Keynesian in an article in the Washington Post:

The only way to prevent a deepening recession will be a temporary program of increased government spending.

Marty thinks the tax rebates earlier this year did not do much to stimulate consumer spending. I think Marty is too quick in reaching this conclusion: Other scholars who have seriously analyzed the data disagree.

If there is going to be another fiscal stimulus, there will likely be a division between those who want tax rebates to households and those who want to help states pay for extra infrastructure spending. I have a compromise, based on the grand U.S. tradition of federalism: Let each state decide.

Congress could pass a fiscal stimulus of a certain amount per person but offer two ways to have it paid out. Each state governor could be allowed to determine whether to take the money as state aid or have it paid directly to his or her state's citizens. Those governors who think they have valuable infrastructure projects ready to go would take the money. Those who do not would let their citizens take the extra cash. When designing a fiscal stimulus, there is no compelling reason for one size fits all. Let each governor make a choice and answer to his or her state voters.

Happy Halloween!

The Pigou Club: Canadian Division

Check out this open letter from 255 Canadian economics professors in support of a carbon tax.

Get Ready for Deflation

Says NYU economist Nouriel Roubini.

How to Rework Bad Mortgages

Yale economist John Geanakoplos and lawyer Susan Koniak propose a way to deal with troubled mortgages:

we propose legislation that moves the reworking function from the paralyzed master servicers and transfers it to community-based, government-appointed trustees. These trustees would be given no information about which securities are derived from which mortgages, or how those securities would be affected by the reworking and foreclosure decisions they make. Instead of worrying about which securities might be harmed, the blind trustees would consider, loan by loan, whether a reworking would bring in more money than a foreclosure.

The government expense would be limited to paying for the trustees — no small amount of money, but much cheaper than first paying off the security holders by buying out the loans, which would then have to be reworked anyway. Our plan would also be far more efficient than having judges attempt this role. The trustees would be hired from the ranks of community bankers, and thus have the expertise the judiciary lacks.

Cutler & Mankiw

A Panel Discussion of the Presidential Candidates' Economic Policies.

** Today **

Wednesday, Oct 29, 4 to 5:30 pm.
Science Center Hall A.

All are welcome.

Addendum: This event is free, which is a bargain compared to other venues:

A reception, policy discussion and lunch was offered in Newark, N.J., with David Cutler, Obama for America’s senior health-care adviser, for $500 for a guest or $2,300 for a V.I.P.

And you don't even have to travel to Newark!

Update: The Crimson reports on the event.

Two Questions for SAM

Andrew Caplin et al. propose a way to stop home foreclosures:

The way to do so is through the shared appreciation mortgage, or SAM. The concept is simple: Homeowners are offered the chance to write down a portion of their mortgage debt, but at the same time, they are required to share future appreciation gains with those who helped them out....

For example, a homeowner unable to support payments on a house purchased for $200,000 that today is worth only $150,000 might be offered a write-down of up to $50,000. But this would not be a free lunch.

With the SAM, once the value began appreciating above $150,000, the mortgage holders would be due their share. The details of the write down and the appreciation sharing could be tailored to different circumstances. But one way to give lenders a share of the upside would be to pay back some of the write down if the house is later sold.

This is like Zingales's Plan B.

I can see the attraction of these ideas, but I have two questions:

1. Would a law giving homeowners the right to write down their mortgages in exchange for equity attract so many homeowners that financial institutions would suffer even bigger hits than they already have? As these authors note, foreclosure is unpleasant for everyone. But because it is so unpleasant, some homeowners who are underwater on their mortgages keep paying them anyway. If we give them a better alternative, why would they?
2. If Congress were to pass a law allowing homeowners to rewrite their mortgage contracts, and lenders suffered losses as a result, what would the constitutional implications be? The fifth amendment says "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Could lenders get "just compensation" for losses that resulted because Congress crammed down an equity-for-debt swap? If so, would this be the best use of taxpayer funds?

Update: Andrew brings to my attention his longer, earlier treatment of the issue. He also responds to my questions. In response to the first question, he writes:

The offer would come from the lender (not borrower) in cases in which there is a stop in payment on the mortgage. Offering this on top of a standard write-down is an option that is currently not in their arsenal, a fact that many of them are not aware of (essentially ruled out by the tax code). One offers incentives for the writedown e.g. by exempting the shared appreciation strip from capital gains taxes. This is then part of the workout routine that would be far more attractive than a pure write-down, and often superior to enforcing default.

Suppose someone stops payment on their mortgage without needing to just because this offer is potentially open. They can be offered some powerful discouragement: (a) Increasing share of appreciation with increasing write down; (b) Give lenders ability to check income. There would then be a high % dedicated to the loan (you won't want this if you are doing fine or expect to recover income); potentially, have payments on the mortgage rise with income if one needs to work this angle harder.

The complete incentive system could be designed in a dynamic manner, adjusting as evidence of excessive use came to light.

In response to the second question:

This would be voluntary negotiation. The idea would be to set up the incentives for it in the tax code. It simply dominates current options in most circumstances.

Thanks, Andrew.